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In contemporary Europe, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“ECJ”) functions as a uniquely authoritative international 
court. Its key doctrines—direct effect and supremacy—ensure a 
relatively effective enforcement of European legislation compared to 
standard international organizations. Likewise, the system of 
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preliminary references sent from national courts to the ECJ has given 
voice to private litigants across Europe to pursue the rights given 
them by the European treaties and legislation. In fact, the ECJ has 
today become so central in the EU that sympathetic academic 
observers claim it has become a European Supreme Court of sorts 
and that it has built a constitutional, proto-federal legal order.1 How 
did this happen? How could a set of international treaties—the 
Treaties of Rome (1957)—albeit of a somewhat unusual nature, 
gradually attain the status of a constitution or at least lead to what 
might be termed a “constitutional practice”?2  
This has been the key question of a new emerging field of legal 
history focusing on the foundation and development of European 
public law. Drawing on new evidence from available private, state, 
and European archives, the new historical research goes behind the 
scenes to unveil the world in which European public law was 
created. The result is a more complex and deeper understanding of 
the social, institutional, legal, and ideological roots of European 
 
 1. See ROBERT LECOURT, L’EUROPE DES JUGES (1976) (asserting ECJ is a 
higher court penetrating the rule of everyday life of member states); Olivier 
Audéoud, L’acquis Communautaire, du “Mythe” á la Pratique, 33 REVUE 
D’ÉTUDES COMPARATIVES EST-OUEST 67 (2002); G. Frederico Mancini, The 
Making of a Constitutional Europe, 26 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 595 (1989) 
(proposing that the EJC has created a federal-type structure in Europe). See 
generally JOSEPH WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW 
CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
(1999); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational 
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981). 
 2. See generally Stein, supra note 1 (supporting the notion that the 
“constitutional practice” concept is preferred to the standard mainstream concept 
of “constitutionalization” because the latter implies that the ECJ successfully 
transformed the Treaties of Rome into a sort of proto-federal European 
constitution). I do not dispute that the ECJ has tried to achieve this objective, but 
by employing the concept “constitutional practice” instead, we avoid any 
premature assumptions about the nature of the outcome. See generally JOHN ERIK 
FOSSUM & AGUSTÍN JOSÉ MENÉNDEZ, THE CONSTITUTION’S GIFT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY FOR A DEMOCRATIC EUROPEAN UNION (2001) 
(providing an interesting attempt to conceptualize alternative processes of 
“constitutionalization” based on a comparative historical approach). This article 
will argue that the constitutional practice of the European institutions—in partial 
agreement with Fossum and Menéndez—has not decisively put the EU on the path 
of constitutionalization. See Part VI for a fuller discussion on this point. See Treaty 
of Rome, Apr. 24, 1958, 294 U.N.T.S. 4300 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome] 
(establishing the European Economic Community, which later became the 
European Union). 
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public law.3 This article will discuss the results of this new field of 
research and how it contributes to the overall understanding of the 
development and nature of European public law. This will be done in 
three steps. First, Part II shall take a brief look at the legal and social 
sciences research on the European public law in a historical 
perspective. Second, Parts III, IV, and V shall go through three 
particular dimensions to which the new historical literature 
contributes. Finally, Part VI shall discuss to what extent the new 
historical literature offers a revisionist account to the mainstream 
understanding of the history of European public law in law and the 
social sciences. 
II. EXPLAINING EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW— 
A BRIEF HISTORY  
OF AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FIELD 
Today, the field of EU legal studies is a particularly varied and 
deeply interdisciplinary subfield of broader European studies. 
However, until the late 1970s, the major contributions to the analysis 
of European public law came mainly from jurists, both academic and 
professional.4 In the aftermath of the key ECJ judgments of Van 
Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v. E.N.E.L. (1964), which introduced 
direct effect and primacy of European law, a separate field of EU 
legal academia emerged.5 The main occupation of legal writers in the 
 
 3. See generally BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: 
WEST GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 ix (2012) 
(noting that most scholars have failed to examine the process of legal integration in 
the European Union in the historical context of the time in which integration was 
occurring); Morten Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’ 
European Law: Some Reflections on How to Study the History of European Law, 
in EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM 639 (Henning Koch et al. eds., 2010) 
[hereinafter Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’ 
European Law] (providing an overview of the history of European “constitutional” 
law); 21 CONT. EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) (2012) (containing publications 
concerning European public law); 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. (2008) 
(containing key publications relating to the study of European public law). 
 4. See Harm Schepel & Rein Wesseling, The Legal Community: Judges, 
Lawyers, Officials and Clerks in the Writing of Europe, 3 EUR. L.J. 165, 171–76 
(1997) (stressing that European legal doctrine is written by an unusually high 
percentage of staff from administrative and judicial institutions compared to 
writers of national public law and national economic law journals). 
 5. See Case C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587 (establishing 
supremacy of European law over the laws of the individual member states); Case 
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first decades was doctrinal commentary employing what could be 
characterized as an apolitical reading of the development of 
European public law.6 According to this scholarship, the ECJ had 
simply applied the rules of the Treaties of Rome in a systematic, 
legally authoritative manner. If certain judgments were considered 
controversial by governments or the general public, this was by no 
means evidence of court activism; rather, it was an expression of the 
wavering political will of the member states to fulfill the obligations 
of the treaties they had ratified.7 The high quality of ECJ case law, it 
was argued, also constituted a key factor behind what, in this 
literature, was argued to be the gradual acceptance by national 
judiciaries of European public law doctrines and practices.8 In fact, 
the process of developing European public law was mainly one of 
legal argument and persuasion. While various discussions about the 
nature of European public law, particularly in the 1950s and early 
1960s, touched upon whether it was merely a subset of international 
law or alternatively of a constitutional nature,9 from the mid-1960s 
onwards, ECJ judges were generally keen to sidestep such politically 
fraught debates and maintain a formalist position.10  
 
C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1 
(establishing that certain provisions of the EEC Treaty create individual rights that 
must be protected by national courts). 
 6. See Martin Shapiro, Comparative Law and Comparative Politics, 53 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 537, 538 (1980) (offering the classic description of this supposedly 
apolitical EU law field). 
 7. Cf. id. at 541–42 (asserting that the goal was to move toward European 
internationalism but, in reality, a “growing complexity and diversity of political 
loyalties” has manifested). 
 8. See id. at 538 (describing the idealistic view of European case law as 
simply discovering the true interpretation of European law). 
 9. See, e.g., 6 ACTES OFFICIELS DU CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL D’ÉTUDES SUR 
LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE DU CHARBON ET DE L’ACIER (A. Giuffrè ed., 
1958); Gerhard Bebr, The Relation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
Law to the Law of the Member States: A Peculiar Legal Symbiosis, 58 COLUM. L. 
REV. 767 (1958) (discussing the conflicts between member state constitutions and 
the treaty, but not referring to the treaty itself as a sort of constitution); Pierre 
Pescatore, Rapport General, in ZEHN JAHRE RECHTSPRECHUNG DES 
GERICHTSHOFS DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 520, 520 (1963) 
(representing interesting examples of discussions concerning the nature of 
European public law in the early period). 
 10. See, e.g., André M. Donner, The Constitutional Powers of the Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, 11 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 128 (1974) 
(arguing that, in using these documents, judges are “exercising a substantial 
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From the late 1970s, legal scholarship was fundamentally 
transformed and moved away from the original apolitical reading. 
Two scholars—the most prominent American-based expert, Eric 
Stein from Ann Arbor, and a young Joseph H. H. Weiler, then a 
Ph.D. candidate from the European University Institute in 
Florence—formulated, at first independently, and later to some 
extent in mutual inspiration, what would in a decade develop into the 
new scientific paradigm.11 While pursuing different arguments, they 
agreed that the ECJ had made an active choice in favor of 
integration. By interpreting the Treaties of Rome as if they amounted 
to a constitution, the ECJ had built a proto-federal legal order; to use 
Stein’s famous conceptualization, the ECJ “constitutionalized” the 
treaties.12 Stein added—based on his intimate personal contacts in the 
European institutions—that the Commission’s Legal Service had 
played a key role in promoting and legitimating this choice.13 
Weiler’s original contribution was to put the development of 
European public law in a comparative perspective with the political 
dimension of the integration process. He argued that when the ECJ 
strengthened enforcement in the legal sphere, a parallel—if not 
necessarily causally linked—strengthening happened of national 
executive power due to the introduction of the veto right in 1966.14 
 
constitutional power” but are not at all “legislating nor constitution-making”); 
Pierre Pescatore, Rôle et Chance du Droit et des Juges dans La Construction 
d’Europe, 26 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 5 (1974) (discussing 
the formation of European public law through a stable constitution, treaties, 
legislative power, and communal judicial power). 
 11. See generally Anne Boerger-De Smedt & Morten Rasmussen, Legitimizing 
the European Court of Justice? The History of the Constitutionalisation Paradigm, 
1950-1992 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished conference paper, University of Copenhagen) 
(describing the process of Stein and Weiler’s development of their constitution-
making theory). 
 12. See Stein, supra note 1, at 24–25 (stating that the “court has been led by the 
Commission in the inexorable progression toward more legal integration”). 
 13. See ERIC STEIN, THOUGHTS FROM A BRIDGE: A RETROSPECTIVE OF 
WRITINGS ON NEW EUROPE AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM 472 (2000) (recounting 
how instrumental Michel Gaudet, the first Director General of the Legal Service of 
the European Commission, was to his witnessing the preliminary efforts of the 
service in the Van Gend and Loos case); Stein, supra note 1, at 24–25 (explaining 
how the Commission’s Legal Service developed an argument that allowed the 
Commission to deal with the treaty as a constitution). 
 14. See JOSEPH WEILER, SUPRANATIONAL LAW AND THE SUPRANATIONAL 
SYSTEM: LEGAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY (1982); Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character 
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The introduction of the national veto right over new policy 
development meant that national governments could tolerate the 
hardening of the enforcement of the legal order. What motivated 
national courts to do so—beyond the assumption that they were 
convinced by the ECJ’s legal argument due to the strength of 
formalism among European judiciaries—was the enhancement of 
court power in general that cooperation with the ECJ spurred. The 
renewed dynamic of the EC connected with the adoption of the 
Single European Act (1986), which reformed the legislative system 
by introducing majority voting in the Council and threatened to break 
the balance on which the “constitutional practice” had rested.15 
However, by 1994 Weiler concluded that the constitutional project 
had not only survived but succeeded and that the member states, 
including national courts, had accepted the “quiet revolution.”  
Inspired by the new dynamics of European integration and the end 
of the Cold War in 1989, a new generation of American political 
scientists were ready to embark on studies of legal integration, which 
had until then generally been overlooked in most political science 
studies of European integration and which seemingly had been so 
successful.16 Young scholars such as Alec Stone Sweet, Karen Alter, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Geoffrey Garret, and Daniel Kelemen began 
to study European public law, write doctoral dissertations, and 
publish important articles and monographs in the 1990s and early 
 
of Supranationalism, in YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN LAW I 267, 268 (F.G. Jacobs 
ed., 1981) (examining the development of the interplay between the constituent 
States of the European Community and the Community’s supranational organs); 
Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2428–29 
(1990) (suggesting that, without the veto power, the member states may not have 
agreed with the “constitutionalization” that the ECJ was implementing). 
 15. Joseph Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991); 
Joseph Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranationalism, 
1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267–306 (1981); Joseph Weiler, Supranational Law and the 
Supranational System: Legal Structure and Political Process in the European 
Community (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, European University Institute). 
 16. But see Ernst B. Haas, Foreword to STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE LAW IN 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION: THE EVOLUTION AND INTEGRATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF 
REGIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1971) (noting that, 
rather than increasing compliance on the national level, European regional law has 
given national executives more flexibility); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE RULE OF 
LAW IN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE PATH OF THE SCHUMAN PLAN (1965) 
(containing a discussion of European integration). 
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2000s.17 At first this new generation of American political scientists 
repeated the traditional—and less than fruitful—American debate of 
whether realism or neofunctionalism best explained the development 
of European public law.18 However, after meeting people like Weiler 
and ECJ Judge Federico Mancini, who trumpeted the achievements 
of the new European rule of law,19 these scholars began to work 
within the confines of the constitutional paradigm, exploring the 
various dimensions that needed to be fleshed out. The originality of 
this new political science literature on European public law came 
from the fact that these young political scientists brought their 
discipline’s conceptual and theoretical tools and analyzed the ECJ as 
a “normal” institutional and political actor.20 From this approach 
emerged an acute sensibility of how the ECJ had managed to 
empower both itself and the other supranational institutions through 
its case law, which deepened the insights already brought forth by 
 
 17. See, e.g., KAREN ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN 
LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (2001) 
[hereinafter ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW] 
(explaining national support for European law and its effects on European 
politics); R. DANIEL KELEMEN, THE RULES OF FEDERALISM: INSTITUTIONS AND 
REGULATORY POLITICS (2004) (taking the position that “the development of EU 
regulatory policy can best be understood by viewing the EU as a federal system”); 
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN 
EUROPE (2000) (explaining the foundational changes that occurred in governance 
that proceeded from the establishment of enforceable constitutions in Europe). 
 18. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A 
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41 (1993) (arguing “that the 
legal integration of the community corresponds remarkably closely to the original 
neofunctionalist model . . .”); Geoffrey Garrett, The Politics of Legal Integration in 
the European Union, 49 INT’L ORG. 171, 171–72 (1995) (discussing the 
development of the EU and analyzing behavior of the national governments and 
the Court of Justice in order to develop a theory of legal integration); Geoffrey 
Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National Governments, and Legal 
Integration in the European Union, 52 INT’L ORG. 149, 175 (1998) (suggesting 
that debating labels, such as “neofunctionalism” and “intergovernmentalism,” is 
unproductive “with respect to scholarship on European integration”). 
 19. See Karen J. Alter, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: 
An American Perspective, in EUROPE: THE NEW LEGAL REALISM, supra note 3, at 
1, 1–2 (recounting the influence Judge Frederico Mancini had in increasing the 
author's interest in the ECJ); Mancini, supra note 1 (discussing the achievements 
of the ECJ in “constitutionalizing” the treaty). 
 20. Cf. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 
17, at 5–8 (noting that the role of the ECJ in the European political process has 
changed as the European legal system has developed). 
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Weiler and Stein.21 In addition, two alternative explanations of how 
the constitutional practice had become accepted by national 
judiciaries and governments emerged.22  
In a string of publications, Alec Stone Sweet argued that EC trade 
liberalization gave rise to private litigation through the mechanism of 
preliminary references from national courts to the ECJ, which in turn 
resulted in case law that furthered the building of a strong legal order 
and furthered trade liberalization.23 A virtual circle of legal 
integration was created beyond the reach of the member states’ 
governments.24 Karen Alter alternatively argued that the reception 
process of ECJ case law was more contentious in the member states 
than hitherto assumed.25 Studying the cases of France and Germany, 
she found widespread resistance among national judiciaries to the 
constitutional practice. The exact shape of European public law was 
consequently a negotiated compromise between the ECJ and national 
courts. The constitutional practice was eventually accepted because 
lower national courts for reasons of self-empowerment helped 
promote European doctrines by the means of the preliminary 
reference mechanism, but also because the dynamics of European 
integration in the 1980s forced the last resistance in national high 
 
 21. See id. at 1 (arguing that the ECJ took its new rule-making authority to 
ensure that member states “respect their European legal obligations”). 
 22. See generally THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS — 
DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT (Anne-
Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1997) (containing an excellent set of national 
receptions studies focusing on courts and to some extent on legal culture); STONE 
SWEET, supra note 17. 
 23. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas L. Brunell, The European Court and the 
National Courts: A Statistical Analysis of Preliminary Reference, 1961−95, 5 J. 
EUR. PUB. POL’Y 66, 72 (1998) [hereinafter Stone Sweet & Brunell, The European 
Court and the National Courts] (arguing that, as the “ECJ’s rulings stabilize 
expectations about the meaning of EC law,” barriers to international trade will 
break down). 
 24. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunell, Constructing a 
Supranational Constitution, in THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 45, 49 
(2004) [hereinafter Stone Sweet & Brunell, Constructing a Supranational 
Constitution] (remarking that negative integration driven by the proposed Common 
Market created voids for European Community laws to fill); see also Marlene 
Wind et al., The Uneven Legal Push for Europe: Questioning Variation When 
National Courts Go to Europe, 10 EUR. UNION POL. 63 (2009) (providing a 
discussion and critique of Stone Sweet’s work on preliminary references). 
 25. See ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 
17, at 1 (noting that prior work did not address why ECJ case law was accepted). 
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courts to bow to the new realities of the European Union.26 While the 
new political literature brought about crucial new insights, it was still 
written within the constitutional paradigm developed by Stein and 
Weiler. As a consequence, the core narrative remained a progressive 
story of successful constitutionalization.  
Ironically, considering the emergence of the new political science 
literature, the legal scholars of the field had already begun by the 
mid-1990s to reconsider the constitutional paradigm, if not the core 
historical narrative underlying it. This major change of perspective 
was prompted partly by the design of the Maastricht Treaty, which 
kept the ECJ out of two of the three pillars, and by the famous 
Maastricht judgment27 of the German Constitutional Court. In the 
latter, the German Supreme Court may have accepted the 
enforcement system of European law de facto, but it seriously 
questioned the autonomy and constitutional nature of European 
law.28 European public law, it was argued, was the result of 
delegation from the national level and in this sense subordinated to 
national constitutions and their guardians—the national supreme 
courts.29 This reminder of persistent national resistance to the 
European constitutional practice caused a serious reassessment 
among EU law scholars of the nature of European law. Wanting for 
ideological reasons to stick with the constitutional denominator, 
scholars continued to develop European constitutionalism.30 A host 
of new theories and conceptualizations emerged, among these 
attempts to provide the European constitutional legal order with a 
 
 26. See id. at 38 (explaining that national courts accepted the supremacy of 
European law because “a compromise is better than legal anarchy”). See generally 
KAREN ALTER, THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL POWER (2009) (containing a 
number of articles in which Alter reflects on her earlier research). 
 27. Bundesverfassungsgericht [Bverfg] [Federal Constitutional Court] Oct. 12, 
1993, BverfGE 155, 1992 (Ger.). 
 28. See PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY: RECONCILING EUROPE 
AND THE NATION-STATE 183–87 (2010) (noting how the decision questioned a 
number of factors including the “EU’s lack of autonomous democratic 
legitimacy”). 
 29. Cf. id. at 166–89 (providing a fresh perspective on the Maastricht 
judgment). 
 30. See generally Matej Avbelj, Questioning EU Constitutionalisms, 9 
GERMAN L.J. 1 (2008) (analyzing the diversification of European constitutional 
theory from the 1990s onwards). 
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stronger normative dimension,31 accepting constitutional pluralism, 
and portraying contention as deliberation32 or reconceptualizing 
European constitutionalism as a new legal form beyond the 
Westphalian paradigm of national sovereignty.33 
The apparent crisis of the constitutional paradigm became full 
blown when recently a number of different studies began to question 
its core assumptions as well as key empirical conclusions. American 
political scientist Lisa Conant questioned the notion that national 
judiciaries and member states had accepted the new European rule of 
law by documenting the extent to which they “contained justice.”34 
American legal scholar Peter Lindseth found that European 
constitutionalism, both in the shape of ECJ case law as well as 
academic analysis, represented a detour from the deeper and more 
legitimate legal roots of European integration that he argued instead 
rested on administrative delegation from national institutions.35 
Finally, a new Bourdieu-based sociological literature emerged, 
exploring for the first time systematically the role of jurists in the 
European construction.36 Scholars such as Mikael Rask Madsen and 
Antoine Vauchez argued that European constitutionalism, including 
the academic variant, merely constituted an attempt of self-
empowerment of jurists and in fact was no more than an ordinary 
 
 31. See, e.g., Joseph Weiler, The Reformation of European Constitutionalism, 
35 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 97 (1997) (noting that a normative discussion is a 
“hallmark” of the reformed discussion of constitutionalism). 
 32. See, e.g., Mattias Kumm, The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Conflict: 
Constitutional Supremacy in Europe Before and After the Constitutional Treaty, 11 
EUR. L.J. 262 (2005) (asserting that, in European law, the particular type of 
pluralism is one that can “avoid conflict in practice”). 
 33. See, e.g., Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. 
REV. 317 (2002) (“Constitutional pluralism recognises that in the post-Westphalian 
world there exists a range of different constitutional sites and processes configured 
in a heterarchical rather than a hierarchical pattern . . . .”). 
 34. See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 3 (2002) (defining “contained justice” as the phenomenon in 
which EU member states obey particular judgments of the European Court of 
Justice while simultaneously ignoring the judgments’ greater implications). 
 35. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 168–69 (asserting that the most important 
aspect of the Maastricht ruling was the parliament’s delegation of power to 
Community institutions). 
 36. See generally SCHEINGOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION, supra note 16 (representing the most important predecessor to also 
focus on the role of jurists); Schepel & Wesseling, supra note 4, at 165–88 
(providing the first Bourdieu analysis of the role of jurists in the European Union). 
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process of juridification.37  
The new historical analyses of the roots and nature of European 
public law are part of this last wave of critical studies.38 Historians 
are latecomers to the field and are undoubtedly inspired by 
theoretical elements in existing explanations. Nevertheless, it is 
important to point out that the methodology of the discipline of 
history is fundamentally different from either law or the social 
sciences. The focus of historians is less to promote an explicit 
theoretical approach. Rather, it is to identify the best possible 
documentary and oral evidence to analyze the historical processes 
that shaped European public law. Archival sources are crucial 
because most of the events that shaped this history actually took 
place behind closed doors, in personal networks or at events that 
were little covered by contemporary press. The new historical 
research has made the first systematic effort to utilize recently 
opened archives, track personal archives, and conduct interviews.39 
As a result, it offers empirically better-founded narratives about the 
social world in which European public law was shaped than most 
 
 37. E.g., Niilo Kauppi & Mikael Rask Madsen, Institutions et Acteurs: 
Rationalité, Réflexivité et Analyse de l'UE, 25 POLITIQUE EUROPÉENNE 87 (2008) 
(providing a sociological perspective on the EU as opposed to economics, law, or 
political science); Antoine Vauchez, The Force of a Weak Field: Law and Lawyers 
in the Government of the European Union (For a Renewed Research Agenda), 2 
INT’L POL. SOC. 128 (2008) (considering the socio-historical and sociological 
factors that shaped European integration). 
 38. See generally Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing 
‘Constitutional’ European Law, supra note 3 (providing a description of a 
historical approach to the study of European public law). 
 39. Recent sociological literature has also employed archives although coupled 
with a strong theoretical bend. See, e.g., Julie Bailleux, Comment l’Europe Vint au 
Droit: Le Premier Congrès International d’études de la CECA (Milan-Stresa 
1957), 60 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE 295 (2010); Antonin Cohen, 
Constitutionalism Without Constitution: Transnational Elites Between Political 
Mobilization and Legal Expertise in the Making of a Constitution for Europe, 32 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 109 (2007) (citing to a number of archival documents to show 
that the history of European integration is crucial to understanding issues related to 
the sociology of law); Antoine Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of 
Judicialization: Van Gend en Loos and the Making of EU Polity, 16 EUR. L.J. 1 
(2010) [hereinafter Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization] 
(arguing “that the debate over the [Van Gend en Loos and Costa] decisions opened 
up an opportunity for legal experts and these gentlemen-politicians of law to 
reframe EC polity in a manner more suitable to their professional and political 
ambitions — that is in judicial terms”). 
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legal and social science literature and, in this way, crucially 
contributes to attempts of generalization and theory building.40  
Although historical inquiry into the foundation and development 
of European public law is still in its infancy, it is now possible to 
summarize the new insights it offers. As we shall see, the historical 
account emerging is a revisionist one that in fundamental ways 
changes our understanding of what shaped European public law, who 
were the key actors, and how the historical processes under 
investigation might be more accurately conceptualized. The next 
three sections highlight the contributions of historical research to our 
understanding of which actors mattered, how to understand what 
historians have termed the constitutional practice in European public 
law, and, finally, how the member states of the EU received 
European law.  
III. WHICH ACTORS SHAPED  
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW? 
With regard to identifying which actors mattered to the 
development of European public law, historical research confirms 
but also deepens recent trends. The tendency in existing literature has 
been to go from focusing mainly on courts—the ECJ and national 
courts—to increasingly include new categories of actors in the 
analysis. In his famous 1981 article, Stein added the legal advisors of 
the Commission, the Council, and the member states, as well as EU 
academia to the field.41 Alter and Stone Sweet later added the private 
litigants to the mix as well.42 Lately, research by scholars such as 
Lisa Conant has explored how various social actors such as trade 
unions, women’s movements, and environmental movements can be 
 
 40. See THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: ORIGINS OF A TRANS- AND 
SUPRANATIONAL POLITY 1950−72 6–8 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2009) 
(providing a more general discussion of the use of historical methodology in 
European studies). 
 41. See Stein, supra note 1 (looking at eleven different cases and categorically 
analyzing the roles that various actors played in the constitutional issues). 
 42. See Stone Sweet & Brunell, The European Court and the National Courts, 
supra note 23, at 66–97 (recognizing that legal integration involves “intimate 
connections” between private litigants, national judiciaries, and the ECJ); see also 
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 17, 
preface (noting that allowing private litigants to bring cases to the ECJ 
distinguishes the EU legal system from other international legal systems). 
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crucial in politicizing ECJ case law against recalcitrant national 
courts, administrations, and governments.43 Finally, Bourdieu-
inspired sociologists have focused on jurists as a particular social 
group of professionals, with their own distinctive habitus and 
interests.44  
Historical research confirms the importance of the various actors 
already investigated by existing research, but it also adds several new 
types of actors, which have been relatively overlooked until now. At 
the European level, historical research, as well as the Bourdieu-
inspired sociological studies mentioned above, has made significant 
strides in understanding how transnational networks of professional 
jurists and academics in and around the Fédération Internationale 
pour le droit Europèen (“FIDE”) promoted and legitimized ECJ case 
law and the constitutional practice from the early 1960s onwards.45 It 
has clearly demonstrated how the academic discipline of EU law 
played a key role in the history of European public law. Finally, the 
role of the legal committee of the European Parliament has until 
recently remained unexplored, but it was clearly an important part of 
 
 43. CONANT, supra note 34. 
 44. See Antoine Vauchez, How to Become a Transnational Elite: Lawyers’ 
Politics at the Genesis of the European Communities (1950−1970), in PARADOXES 
OF EUROPEAN LEGAL INTEGRATION 129 (Hanne Paterson et al. eds., 2008) 
(providing the most accessible presentation of this theory). 
 45. See Karen Alter, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe: The Role of Euro-
law Associations in European Integration, in THE EUROPEAN COURT’S POLITICAL 
POWER, supra note 27, at 63 [hereinafter Alter, Jurist Advocacy Movements in 
Europe] (discussing how various parties and individuals worked to promote legal 
integration and Euro-law); Antoine Vauchez, The Making of the European Union’s 
Constitutional Foundations: The Brokering Role of Legal Entrepreneurs and 
Networks, in TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: 
GOVERNING EUROPE 1945−83 108 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2010) (describing a 
1964 case where two FIDE members made bold assertions in support of 
integration); Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practise: The Role 
of the European Law Associations, in SOCIETAL ACTORS IN EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION: POLITY-BUILDING AND POLICY-MAKING 1958−1992 173 (Wolfram 
Kaiser & Jan-Henrik Meyer eds., 2013) [hereinafter Rasmussen, The Role of the 
European Law Associations] (suggesting that the importance of FIDE in 
establishing an understanding of the rising constitutionalization has been 
overstated yet should still be recognized as a relevant factor); Alexandre Bernier, 
Constructing and Legitimating: Transnational Jurist Networks and the Making of 
a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 399, 406 
(2012) (listing the important benefits FIDE had in the development of European 
Law). 
 1200 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:5 
the coordinated attempt by European institutions to support and 
legitimize the ECJ’s constitutional practice.46  
At the national level, historical research suggests that we have to 
go beyond the classical legal advisors in the foreign ministries.47 
European public law mattered and was followed by several 
ministries from the very outset. Officials both in the Ministries of 
Justice and Foreign Affairs played an important role in how 
European law was perceived and received by each member state. 
Taking a look at the archives of national ministries one can often 
follow a systematic and sophisticated debate about European case 
law.48 At times national administrations attempted to control the 
process of reception, as in the case of Denmark, where the Ministry 
of Justice informally coordinated a response with the judiciary and 
directly controlled how many (that is, very few) and which 
preliminary references Danish courts would send to the ECJ.49 In 
addition, the battle over the status of European law among national 
law academics seriously delayed the establishment of genuine study 
programs of European public law at the Law Faculties of the member 
states.50 We consequently need a very broad analysis of the formation 
of an independent academic field of EU law to properly understand 
how European public law was received and shaped by legal 
academia.51 Finally, there are reasons to believe that the general 
 
 46. See generally Guillaume Sacriste, L’Europe est-elle un État comme les 
Autres? Retour sur la Distinction Public/privé au Sein de la Commission Juridique 
du Parlement Européen des Années 1960, 2012 CULTURES & CONFLICTS 35 (2012) 
(providing a sociological study of the legal committee of the European 
Parliament). A new historical study by Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen is 
currently being conducted in the framework of a new collective research project, 
“Towards a New History of European Public Law,” directed by the present author 
(http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk). 
 47. Cf. Stein, supra note 1, at 1–2 (listing lawyers in foreign ministries as a 
“dominant group” in the European judicial process). 
 48. For examples, consult the collections of the French archives of the Ministry 
of Justice (Archive Nationales, Fontainebleau) or the Foreign Ministry (La 
Courneuve). 
 49. Peter Pagh, Præjudicelle forelæggelser og Juridisk Specialudvalg, 41 
UGESKRIFT FOR RETSVÆSEN 305 (2004). 
 50. For initial analysis of how FIDE did not very successfully affect the 
member states, see Bernier, supra note 45, and Rasmussen, The Role of the 
European Law Associations, supra note 45. 
 51. A successful attempt to do this with the German cases has recently been 
published. See ANNA KATHARINA MANGOLD, GEMEINSCHAFTRECHT UND 
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public opinion, shaped by newspaper and media coverage, 
occasionally played an important role in defining the stance of 
national courts in key judgments of ECJ case law, such as recently 
demonstrated with regard to the famous German Constitutional Court 
Solange judgment from 1974.52 
Historical research finally provides us with a better understanding 
of the precise roles of the different actors. Focusing until now in 
particular on the first three decades of European public law, 
historical research has been able to document how some of the most 
crucial developments took place outside the courtrooms of the ECJ 
and national courts. One example is the constitutional reforms of the 
Netherlands in 1953 and 1956 that introduced the concept of 
international law supremacy in the Dutch legal order and as a 
consequence set the scene for the establishment of a constitutional 
practice in European public law in 1963 and 1964.53 These reforms 
were part of a broad legal and political battle in the Netherlands over 
the role of international law in the country but also concerned the 
role of the executive and national parliaments vis-à-vis the judiciary 
in a country, where constitutional review was considered illegal.54 
Another example is the role played by the Legal Service of the High 
Authority/European Commission in developing and promoting the 
constitutional practice in European public law.55 A further example 
 
DEUTCHES RECHT. DIE EUROPÄISIERUNG DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSORDNUNG IN 
HISTORISH-EMPIRISCHER SICHT (2011). A general study of the constitutional 
practice in EU law academia will be undertaken in the next three years by doctoral 
student Rebekka Byberg at the University of Copenhagen in the framework of the 
“Towards a New History of European Public Law” project at University of 
Copenhagen. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 52. DAVIES, supra note 3. 
 53. Karin Van Leeuwen, On Democratic Concerns and Legal Traditions: The 
Dutch 1953 and 1956 Constitutional Reforms ‘Towards’ Europe, 21 CONTEMP. 
EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) 357 (2012) (analyzing the Dutch constitutional 
reforms in the early 1950s to offer a different view about the nature of the 
development of European law) (explaining that the Dutch reforms not only defined 
the conditions of Dutch membership in supranational organizations but also 
introduced the idea that international law should have priority over conflicting 
national legislation). 
 54. Id. (2012) (analyzing the Dutch constitutional reforms in the early 1950s to 
offer a different view about the nature of the development of European law). 
 55. Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European 
Law: The History of the Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952–65 21 
CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) 375, 381 (2012) [hereinafter 
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and completely unknown until recently is the extent to which the 
German administration and government at the highest level were part 
of handling the fallout to the German Constitutional Court’s Solange 
decision.56 
To conclude, recent historical research suggests that we need a 
very broad understanding of the actors and societal forces that 
shaped the development of European public law, but it also provides 
precise evidence pertaining to which exact actor influenced key 
events and processes in European public law. 
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW— 
THE TRANSNATIONAL LEVEL 
One of the most important contributions provided by the new 
historical research concerns perhaps the most important set of 
questions in the history of European public law: how and why a 
constitutional practice was established and to what extent national 
governments, administrations, and courts accepted it. According to 
the classic, mainstream narrative, discussed in the first section, the 
key actor was the ECJ. Through its case law, the court built a 
constitutionalized, proto-federal legal order for Europe.57 The ECJ 
successfully managed to persuade national courts to act as European 
courts, so by the early 1990s a genuine federalized rule of law 
existed in the new European Union.  
Historical research cannot yet give us the full picture of how the 
constitutional practice of European public law developed from the 
mid-1950s to the present day. However, even if only offering a 
partial account, recent historical analyses add both new important 
empirical details as well as what amounts to a revisionist 
interpretation of the nature of the constitutional practice. In this 
section, we shall focus on the processes taking place at the European 
 
Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law] (noting the 
hesitance of most European legal scholars at the time to view the developing law 
through a constitutional lens). 
 56. DAVIES, supra note 3. 
 57. Cf. KELEMEN, supra note 17, at 4–6 (addressing how the link between the 
ECJ and national courts was not intentional, leading one to question whether 
member state control really exists). 
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level, in the supranational institutions and various transnational 
networks, where the constitutional practice arguably originated. In 
the next section, we shall explore how the politics and law of the 
member states provided a constitutive frame for the development of 
European public law, while at the same time a variety of national 
actors resisted and undermined the constitutional practice.  
With regard to the establishment of the constitutional practice, 
recent historical research has given us a much clearer understanding 
of what drove the process.58 The constitutional vision of European 
law had its roots in the various movements for European unity in the 
immediate post-war period favoring a federal model for European 
reconstruction that would fundamentally break with what was 
perceived as the dangerous nationalist past of the continent.59 
National governments never fully adopted the federal visions.60 Plans 
for a federal union in the framework of the Council of Europe in the 
late 1940s and plans for the European Defence Community and a 
European Political Community in the early 1950s all faltered. 
However, the notion that European integration ought to be based on a 
foundation of constitutional law and include a European supreme 
court was present in influential political and legal circles.61  
The European treaties that founded the ECSC in 1951 and the 
EEC/Euratom in 1957 were formally of international law and 
controlled by the contracting parties. They included classical features 
of international law, most strikingly in the EEC Treaty, according to 
which national courts were given exclusive competence to apply 
European law in the national legal orders.62 The EEC Treaty, which 
 
 58. See generally 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. (Special Issue No. 3) (2012). 
 59. See Cohen, supra note 39, at 113–20. 
 60. See id. at 109–35 (arguing that federalism emerged as a tool to encourage 
European unity following World War II but was not fully implemented by the 
different European states). 
 61. See id. at 115–23 (suggesting that the idea of a European Constitution drew 
the attention of important law professors and practitioners); Morten Rasmussen, 
The Origins of a Legal Revolution – The Early History of the European Court of 
Justice, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 77, 80–81 (2008) (discussing that, in the 
early 1950s, influential political groups took the initiative to draft a constitution for 
the European Political Community and to institute a European supreme court based 
on the U.S. Supreme Court). 
 62. See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 215 (stating that the legal 
principles common to the laws of the European member states shall apply in cases 
of non-contractual liability). 
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would be the central foundational document after 1958, essentially 
created a Community in which member state governments (together) 
would legislate and where national administrations and courts would 
respectively implement and apply European law in the member 
states. The Commission merely took the initiative to legislative acts, 
performed a monitoring task whether member states fulfilled their 
obligations (aided by the relatively weak infringement procedure 
before the ECJ outlined in article 169), and to some extent and at a 
general level advised how national administrations would apply 
European law. Considering that the purpose of the EEC was to set up 
a common market of major importance to the social and economic 
stability of the member states, it is understandable that governments 
created a Community system in which national states both at the 
political and administrative level were deeply involved in European 
policy making. What was designed was not a federal polity, despite 
the existence of a seemingly proto-federal institutional structure 
including a court and an assembly, but rather a system in which 
national governments attempted to control the decision-making, 
application, and administration of European public policies.63 The 
rise of the Council of Minister’s Permanent Representatives 
(“COREPER”) and their sub-committees, and consequently the 
extension of national administrations into a European administrative 
space in the 1960s, can be seen as an expression of the same trend.64 
The regulatory nature of European integration was clearly an 
extension of what Peter Lindseth has termed the post-war 
administrative state into a new European space.65 
However, despite the general design of the EEC Treaty and the 
deeper trends involved in the transformation of the post-war 
 
 63. See generally ANDRE M. DONNER, THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1968) (providing a nuanced legal assessment of the 
ways national powers were completely intertwined with all dimensions of the 
Community and rejecting the notion that European law could be autonomous). 
Because the EEC did not have two separate levels of policy making or 
administration, a federal legal order would not correspond to the actual social, 
administrative, and political practice. 
 64. See generally Ann-Christina L. Knudsen & Morten Rasmussen, A 
European Political System in the Making 1958−1970: The Relevance of Emerging 
Committee Structures, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HIST. 51 (2008) (discussing, inter 
alia, the background of COREPER and its role in the origins of the European 
system). 
 65. LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 180–87. 
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European states to cope with the regulatory demands of welfare 
states and modern economies, discrete federalist elements were at the 
same time inserted in the legal fabric of the treaties. The federalist 
vision was first promoted by the German delegation in 1951 in the 
Treaty of Paris and later by a committee of legal experts in the EEC 
Treaty in 1957.66 Among the constitutional or federalist elements 
were the core objective of the Court to uphold the law, implying that 
a European rule of law, or in German “Rechtgemeinschaft,” should 
be developed (article 164 in the EEC Treaty), and also the 
mechanism of preliminary reference, which would eventually play an 
instrumental role in allowing the ECJ to develop its case law (article 
177 in the EEC Treaty).67  
Most national administrations believed they were dealing with 
ordinary international treaties, but in the High Authority of the ECSC 
and later the European Commission, the Legal Service and its 
director Michel Gaudet had a different idea. Inspired by federal 
ideas, Gaudet believed that the ECJ should not interpret the letter of 
the law, protecting the sovereignty of the contracting parties, as was 
supposedly the tradition under international law.68 Instead, the court 
should focus on the federal objectives of the treaties and, by means 
of a teleological method, develop the competences of the 
Communities in order to allow the High Authority or the 
Commission to conduct the necessary policies to achieve the 
objectives of the treaties.69 The belief that the legal nature of the 
ECSC and the EEC went beyond international law was rejected not 
 
 66. Anne Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice dans les Négociations du 
Traité de Paris Instituant la CECA, 14 J. EUR. INTEGRATION HISTORY 7, 28–29 
(2008) [hereinafter Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice]. 
 67. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 164, 177 (stating that the Court 
shall ensure that the Treaty be applied in accordance with the law and that it has 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings); Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice, 
supra note 66 (stating that, during the Treaty of Rome negotiations, the jurists—in 
particular, the German ones—emphasized the importance of developing a uniform 
European jurisprudence in which the ECJ would act as the main judicial body with 
regards to the interpretation of the Treaty); Anne Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating 
the Foundations of European Law, 1950–57: The Legal History of the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 339 (Special Issue No. 3) (2012) 
[hereinafter Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European Law]. 
 68. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 55. 
 69. Id. 
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only in national legal debates, such as at the most famous venue of 
German public law, the Deutsche Staatsrechtslehrer congresses in 
1953 and 1959,70 but also by scholars of international law who 
considered the ECSC merely a subset of international law.71 Finally, 
before 1958 the ECJ did not follow the lead of the Legal Service and 
generally abstained from entering too much into doctrinal territory in 
its case law, probably due to the composition of the judges on the 
bench.72 
This changed with the foundation of the EEC in 1958. Because the 
legal tools of the EEC treaty were modest and could be construed as 
insufficient to match the grand objective of creating a full common 
market, the Legal Service’s teleological argument made much better 
sense than it had with regard to the ECSC. After all, a common 
market was of great future importance to the societies of the member 
states, matching much better the implicit federalist assumptions 
underlying the teleological method of interpretation. In contrast, the 
ECSC had, after the fall of the EDC/EPC in July 1954, merely 
constituted a narrow coal and steel community with a doubtful 
political future. Then it mattered less that the purpose of the design 
of the EEC Treaty had been exactly to keep the political and 
administrative control in the hands of national institutions.  
Several factors contributed to what amounted to a general 
breakthrough for the legal philosophy of the Legal Service in the first 
half of the 1960s. Firstly, the constitutional reforms of the 
Netherlands in 1953 and 1956 introduced the notion that 
 
 70. Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtsstaates. Die auswärtige Gewalt der 
Bundesrepublik Berichte und Aussprache zu den Berichten in den Verhandlungen 
der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer zu Bonn am 15. und 
16. Oktober 1953 (Nachdr. d. Ausg. 1954); Das Grundgesetz und die öffentliche 
Gewalt internationaler Staatsgemeinschaften. Der Plan als verwaltungsrechtliches 
Institut Verhandlungen der Tagung der Vereinigung der Deutschen 
Staatsrechtslehrer zu Erlangen vom 7. bis 9. Oktober 1959 (Nachdr. d. Ausg. 
1960), 1968. See DAVIES, supra note 3 (discussing the importance and 
implications of these debates for the German reception). 
 71. See, e.g., Eugenio Greppi, A propos du caractère supranational de la 
C.E.C.A.: Récentes contributions scientifiques, Les cahiers du Bruges, Recherches 
européennes, 1956, Quaterly I, 25−39; Bailleux, supra note 39 (asserting that the 
ECSC is governed by supranational principles of law). 
 72. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 55 (noting the change in the composition of the ECJ in 1958 and a move 
toward constitutional interpretation of European law). 
  
2013] REWRITING THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 1207 
international law was supreme vis-à-vis national law if it was 
“binding on anyone” or, with a somewhat ambiguous expression, 
self-executing.73 Decided by parliament, at first in opposition to the 
Dutch government in 1952, these reforms were explicitly referring to 
the new system of European public law as a justification of the new 
far-reaching clause, which were unique in international law.74 With 
the introduction of the system of preliminary references in the EEC 
Treaty, Dutch lawyers—organized by the Dutch association of 
European law—saw an opportunity to strengthen enforcement of 
European law in the Netherlands and throughout the EC. The 
question was to what extent European public law, including the 
treaties, was “self-executing.”75 Such clauses would automatically be 
attributed supremacy in the Dutch constitutional context but would 
also most likely force a position either in the other member states or 
in Luxembourg on the question of European law supremacy. Dutch 
courts raised this question several times and in general drove the 
development of the mechanism of preliminary references in the first 
half of the 1960s, sending fifteen out of the first eighteen cases.76 
Secondly, European law movements in the member states were 
established. The French Association des Juristes Européens was the 
first in 1954 and was followed between 1958 and 1961 by similar 
associations in the other member states. In 1961 an umbrella 
organization, the FIDE, was founded.77 The European law 
associations provided a crucial link between the emerging academic 
and professional field of EU law and the European institutions and 
would play an important role in legitimating and promoting the ECJ 
doctrines to national governments, administrations, judiciaries, firms, 
and legal academics. Moreover, they occasionally mobilized 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Van Leeuwen, supra note 53. 
 75. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
supra note 55 (noting the debate over whether article 12 of the EEC Treaty was 
self-executing and to what extent it created “rights for citizens applicable before 
national courts”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See FIDE, FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE POUR LE DROIT EUROPÉEN, 
http://www.fide2012.eu/FIDE/id/81/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2013) (stating that FIDE 
is an organization that “focuses on research and analysis of European Union law 
and EU institutions, and their interaction with the legal systems of the member 
states”). 
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important cases through the system of preliminary references, as was 
the case in Van Gend en Loos.78 Finally, the balance inside the ECJ 
more or less accidentally changed in a pro-federal direction with the 
nomination of two new judges, Frenchman Robert Lecourt and 
Italian Alberto Trabucchi.79 Taken together, these factors provided 
the legal case and changed the attitude of the ECJ to the legal 
philosophy of the Legal Service.  
As a result, the ECJ in two seminal judgments—Van Gend en 
Loos in 196380 and Costa v. E.N.E.L. in 196481—accepted the legal 
philosophy of the Legal Service with regard to the enforcement of 
European law. European legal norms—even treaty articles—could 
have direct effect and supremacy over conflicting national law. The 
ECJ made the final call based on preliminary references from 
national courts. The reasoning underlying the judgments was 
teleological by necessity. The Treaties of Rome did not include 
direct effect and supremacy of European law as general principles.82 
In fact, not even the legal committee of experts—federally inclined 
as they were—had during the negotiations on the EEC Treaty 
planned for the mechanism of preliminary reference to become an 
alternative enforcement mechanism protecting the individual citizens 
against the lack of implementation by the member states’ 
 
 78. Alter, Jurist Advocacy Movements in Europe, supra note 45, at 69–79; see 
Rasmussen, The Role of the European Law Associations, supra note 45, at 173–74 
(explaining the importance of legal associations like FIDE in shaping EU law 
through their influence with the ECJ); Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of 
Judicialization, supra note 39, at 116–18 (describing how FIDE elevated the 
importance of Van Gend en Loos prior to the ECJ’s decision). 
 79. See generally Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing 
‘Constitutional’ European Law, supra note 3, at 9–15 (discussing the impact that 
Lecourt and Trabucchi had on the ECJ). 
 80. See generally Case C-26/62, Van Gen en Loos v. Administratie der 
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1. 
 81. See generally Case C-6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 587. 
 82. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, 
supra note 55. Council regulations were directly applicable, but their supremacy 
depended on national constitutional requirements at least until the Costa v. 
E.N.E.L. judgment. Council directives were framework decisions, which national 
administrations could apply independently, choosing the means they saw fit. With 
regard to treaty articles, there was seemingly an agreement that articles 85 and 86 
of the EEC Treaty had direct effect, even if national case law in 1960 and 1961 did 
not agree. 
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administrations of their European obligations.83 However, while the 
doctrines introduced to strengthen the enforcement of the treaties 
may have been controversial and surprising to the member states—
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, alongside the Court’s own 
Advocate General, had opposed the principle of direct effect at the 
Van Gend en Loos case—the practical consequences were limited.84 
At first, the ECJ cautiously limited the doctrines to treaty articles that 
constituted negative obligations, i.e., clauses on member states not to 
act, as was the case in Van Gend en Loos, finding that member states 
must not increase tariffs in the process of dismantling them (article 
12 of the EEC Treaty).85 The ECJ would later first expand the 
doctrines to additional treaty articles and eventually in the 1970s also 
controversially, and only partly successfully, attempt to declare 
certain types of Council directives directly effective.86  
From the Van Gend en Loos case onwards, the European 
institutions and FIDE mobilized in support of the new revolutionary 
ECJ doctrines. Commission President Walter Hallstein already came 
out in support of supremacy of European law in a public speech to 
the European Parliament before the Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgment had 
passed. Likewise, a pamphlet was published in which Hallstein and 
former Judge Nicola Catalano explained how European law by 
necessity rested on the core principles of direct effect and 
supremacy. Following the Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgment, the legal 
committee of the European Parliament, guided by Gaudet, authored a 
 
 83. See Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European Law, 
supra note 67, at 353–54. The Groupe de rédation believed the Commission and 
national governments would protect individual interests by the means of the 
infringement procedure (article 169 for the Commission and article 171 for the 
national governments). Id. 
 84. Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, supra note 39, at 
12. 
 85. Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law, supra 
note 55, at 391–94. See generally Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 12 (declaring 
that “Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new 
customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect”). 
 86. Francesca Bignami, Conference Report, Biennial Conference of the 
European Union Studies Association, Comparative Law and the Rise of the 
European Court of Justice (Mar. 3–5, 2011), at 21, available at 
http://www.eustudies.org/files/2011%20program%20final.pdf (describing the 
reticence of all parties involved to give direct effect to Council directives and the 
series of ECJ cases that established the rule). 
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report, which endorsed the new doctrines of European law and 
recommended that the member states accept the binding nature of 
European public law. FIDE likewise endorsed direct effect in a 
public statement at the second FIDE congress in The Hague, in 
October 1963, and at the national level, seminars and conferences 
were organized to explain and promote the new doctrines to national 
audiences and legal elites. All in all, quite a massive campaign 
endorsing the new doctrines of the ECJ consequently took place in 
1964 and 1965.87 To the emerging field of EU law academia, the new 
doctrines would define European law as a new legal field separate 
from both international law and domestic law and worth studying on 
its own terms. EU law was already taught at a few European studies 
centers in the six member states. Now an increasing number of 
universities began to establish chairs in European law, and a number 
of EU law journals were established. The way the constitutional 
practice of the ECJ shaped the early academic field of EU law and 
the early role of FIDE as advocates of ECJ case law would leave a 
strong mark on scholarly analysis.  
What drove the establishment of a constitutional practice in 
European public law? The new history presented above suggests that 
the breakthrough of the constitutional practice was not the result of 
functional pressures or the result of a clear legal logic flowing from 
the Treaties of Rome. Indeed, the legal and political forces seem 
overwhelmingly to have disfavored a constitutional interpretation of 
the Treaties of Rome. That it nevertheless happened could be traced 
to the combination and contingency of a complex set of factors and 
the element of chance. The evidence furthermore brings out just how 
important the Legal Service of the High Authority/the Commission 
was to the early development of European law and identified the 
federalist ideology and institutional interests that motivated the 
service. Finally, the story demonstrated how a mobilization of 
European institutions and transnational networks attempted to 
 
 87. See generally Vauchez, The Transnational Politics of Judicialization, supra 
note 39 (explaining in detail that this mobilization in support of the new 
revolutionary ECJ doctrines came about after the Van Gend en Loos and Costa 
rulings); see also, Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European 
Law, supra note 55, at 394–96 (noting that the second and third FIDE conferences 
dealt with direct effect and primacy, and thus provided additional support for the 
new doctrines). 
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legitimize and promote the constitutional practice. The breakthrough 
was consequently far from the work alone of the ECJ.  
What was the nature of the process? These conclusions suggest 
that only a weak coalition of European institutions and 
transnationally networked pro-European jurists supported the 
constitutional practice. In European venues such as the European 
Parliament or at the biannual FIDE congresses, the breakthrough 
may have been felt as a momentous development. However, in the 
member states, national administrative and legal elites held very 
different views on the legal nature of European integration and 
generally did not necessarily share the enthusiasm. The constitutional 
revolution would have a very limited impact on the member states 
before the mid-1980s, as we shall see below.  
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW—THE ROLE OF THE 
MEMBER STATES 
The reception of European public law in the member states has 
until recently been a field dominated by the interpretation offered by 
the constitutional paradigm. The assumption has been that member 
states progressively accepted European public law and that by the 
early 1990s a European rule of law existed.88 This conclusion was 
drawn from the relative lack of government action to curb the 
influence of the ECJ and was reinforced by analyses of how the 
dialogue between national courts and the ECJ developed. By 1991, 
national high courts seemingly all had accepted de facto the 
constitutional practice.89 However, the design of the Maastricht 
Treaty and the German Constitutional Court’s Maastricht judgment 
 
 88. See, e.g., ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, 
supra note 17, at 27–33 (explaining the establishment of a European rule of law); 
Joseph Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The ECJ and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 510, 510–17 (1994) (asserting that certain proponents of this constitutional 
paradigm found that the effect of the European constitutional doctrine was to limit 
national autonomy by acquiescing to the principles of European public law). 
 89. See, e.g., Case C-213/89, Regina v. Sec. of State for Transp., 1991 E.C.R. 
603 (holding that, in interpreting Community law, a national court must “consider 
that the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of 
national law must set aside that rule”); see also Raoul Georges Nicolo & Another, 
[1990]1 CMLR 173 (Conseil d’Etat, Ass., Oct. 20, 1989) (Council of State, 
Assembly) (applying the EEC Treaty to the Republic of France). 
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suggested that these conclusions were premature even when only 
considering the “high politics” of European public law.90 Recent 
research now suggests that in most member states national courts and 
administrations did not necessarily apply European law 
systematically, and if they did there was no guarantee that they take 
the ECJ case law into account.91 No systematic empirical analysis yet 
exists of how national courts generally applied European law across 
member states. As Michal Bobek has recently argued, we cannot 
assume that the silence on the side of national courts necessarily 
means that European law is applied in all the relevant cases; rather, 
the general evidence suggests that this is not the case.92 Likewise, 
recent social science research has uncovered how the administrative 
practices of member states often ignored, or even consciously 
limited, the legal and practical consequences of ECJ case law.93 
Although the historical research on the reception of European law by 
the member states is still in its infancy, preliminary results confirm 
this more skeptical take on to what extent member states accepted 
the constitutional practice of European public law. It should be 
pointed out that the new historical literature focuses on the period 
before 1986. 
The historical analyses of the negotiations of the Treaties of Paris 
and Rome have revealed the extent to which most national 
governments and diplomats conceived these treaties and the ECJ as 
 
 90. See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht [Bverfg] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] Oct. 12, 1993, BverfGE 155, 1992 (Ger.) (reiterating that the law of the EU 
must be supported by the parliaments and people of the member states). 
 91. See generally Michal Bobek, Of Feasibility and Silent Elephants: 
Legitimacy of the Court of Justice and National Courts, in JUDGING EUROPE’S 
JUDGES: THE LEGITIMACY OF CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
EXAMINED (Maurice Adams et al. eds., 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129683 (arguing that the 
discrepancy between the number of cases involving European law in national 
courts and the very low number of preliminary references clearly suggests that 
national courts probably disregard or lack knowledge about European law). 
 92. Id. 
 93. See, e.g., CONANT, supra note 34, at 3 (noting the role that member states 
and administrative practices play in the interpretation of European public law); see 
also Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen, Judicial Policy-Making and Europeanization: The 
Proportionality of National Control and Administrative Discretion, 18 J. EUR. 
PUB. POLICY 944 (2011) (pointing out that national executives have numerous 
means at their disposal to counter ECJ directives). 
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belonging to international law.94 This attitude was clearly reflected in 
the way national jurisconsultes defended their governments before 
the ECJ in the 1950s and 1960s. Here, national governments 
repeatedly objected to the construction of constitutional doctrines, 
most famously when Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands 
rejected the notion that article 12 (EEC treaty) could create 
individual rights for citizens before national courts at the Van Gend 
en Loos case.95  
When the ECJ carried through its legal revolution with the Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa v. E.N.E.L. judgments, considering the 
attitude of national governments, administrations, and courts, it 
probably wisely chose to limit the concrete effects in terms of 
enforcement at first. National governments, administrators, and high 
courts immediately took notice when, in 1967, the ECJ stepped up its 
game, after changes on the bench had brought in influential federalist 
judges such are Pierre Pescatore.96 The ECJ developed European 
public law in a number of directions in the 1970s, but it was perhaps 
the questions of enforcement and human rights that provoked the 
sharpest national responses.97 With regard to the strengthening of 
enforcement, the ECJ took the highly controversial step to declare 
certain types of directives directly effective. Directives were by 
definition of the treaties (article 189)98 and in the member states 
believed to be framework decisions that national administrations 
would be empowered to implement by means of their own choice. In 
particular the British House of Lords and the French Conseil d’État 
 
 94. See Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 66 (recognizing an 
advancement of European integration through the constitutionalization of the 
founding treaties); Boerger-De Smedt, Negotiating the Foundations of European 
Law, supra note 67, at 354 (discussing the creation of Community Law, which 
functioned like international law). 
 95. See Stein, supra note 1, at 25 (listing a number of government positions of 
key doctrinal cases from 1954 to 1980). 
 96. See Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, From International Law to a 
European Rechtsgemeinschaft: Towards a New History of European Law, 
1950−1979, PUBLICATIONS EUR. UNION HISTORIANS (forthcoming 2013) (noting 
that the new judges provided a generational shift in the judiciary as well as a 
doctrinal one). 
 97. See, e.g., Case C-9/70 Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 826. See 
generally Bignami, supra note 86 (analyzing Grad in depth). 
 98. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, art. 189. 
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reacted sharply to the ECJ case law.99 In France the national 
assembly introduced the so-called Aurillac amendment in 1980, 
stating that French courts should not apply European law 
independently from the Foreign Ministry.100 Even if the French 
Senate did not heed this call, the ECJ had now been warned and 
eventually moderated its case law on directives.101 In the field of 
human rights, the ECJ case law likewise provoked a most serious 
national rebuke. The core pillar of the constitutional practice, 
primacy, touched the very core of German identity in post-war 
Europe, namely basic rights. What happened to the sacrosanct 
catalogue of fundamental human rights if European law trumped the 
German constitution in the areas where sovereignty had been 
surrendered to the EC? The response of the German Constitutional 
Court was not merely a question of kompetenz-kompetenz as it has 
often been portrayed; it was a genuine response to serious worries 
expressed in the national legal elite and public about the undermining 
of basic rights caused by European institutions, which had not yet 
reached a genuine democratic stage of development.102  
So in the 1970s, the ECJ’s strides of strengthening and deepening 
the constitutional practice quickly developed into a conflict of legal 
“high politics.” Moreover, the legal “low politics” of how, if at all, 
national courts applied the case law of the ECJ or European 
legislation in general was far from settled. Unfortunately, neither 
law, the social sciences, or history has, until now, systematically 
explored to what extent national courts actually applied or continue 
to apply European law in the national legal orders. However, recent 
historical research on the development of the Common Market from 
the 1960s to the mid-1980s implies that national administrations and 
courts to a large degree must have sidestepped or ignored European 
 
 99. See, e.g., ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, 
supra note 17, at 153 (discussing France’s challenges to the ECJ’s expanding 
authority). 
 100. Id. at 151–57. 
 101. See Bignami, supra note 86, at 25–26 (noting that the ECJ shifted its 
application of direct effect to a “ricochet” theory that made directives only binding 
against states and could therefore no longer be used against individuals in court); 
see, e.g., Case C-152/84 Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area 
Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 737 (holding, in part, that a directive “may be relied on 
against a State authority acting in its capacity as an employer). 
 102. DAVIES, supra note 3. 
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law. Until the Single European Act (“SEA”) in 1986, member states 
continued to conduct what can best be characterized as a policy of 
segmented national markets to protect national socio-economic 
compromises against the potential negative consequences of 
liberalization.103 Efforts by the European institutions to establish the 
four freedoms met very serious obstacles and, if at all, occurred at 
best in a piecemeal and delayed fashion.104 Legal and social science 
research on the role of ECJ case law in the construction of the 
Common Market has told a very different story—one where ECJ 
doctrines gradually strip away singular and discriminatory 
administrative practices of the member states.105 However, the 
narrow focus of such research on ECJ case law and the responses 
given by governments in the courtroom or collectively in the Council 
of Ministers means that the potentially discriminatory practices of 
national administrations and courts have not been taken sufficiently 
into account. Future research is needed to uncover exactly what role 
ECJ case law played in the construction of the Common Market and 
the SEA reform and provide us with a better understanding of the 
extent to which national administrations and courts actually heeded 
to the ECJ’s case law.106 All in all, current historiography at the very 
least suggests that national resistance to the constitutional practice of 
 
 103. See Introduction to DIRK SPIERENBURG & RAYMOND POIDEVIN, THE 
HISTORY OF THE HIGH AUTHORITY OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL 
COMMUNITY: SUPRANATIONALITY IN OPERATION (1994), 1, 3–4 (alluding that 
socio-economic reasons led to the segmentation of national markets, which in turn 
prevented European unity); EUR. COMM’N, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
1958−1972: HISTORY AND MEMORIES (Michael Dumoulin ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1958-1972: HISTORY AND MEMORIES]; TOBIAS 
WITSCHKE, GEFAHR FÜR DEN WETTBEWERB?: DIE FUSIONSKONTROLLE DER 
EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFT FÜR KOHLE UND STAHL UND DIE 
“REKONZENTRATION” DER RUHRSTAHLINDUSTRIE 1950−1963 (2009). 
 104. See SPIERENBURG & POIDEVIN, supra note 103, at 1–5 (describing the 
obstacles created by the national legal orders, which were skeptical about the 
process of liberalization and the application of European law); WITSCHKE, supra 
note 103; THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1958-1972: HISTORY AND MEMORIES, 
supra note 103. 
 105. See Margaret MacCown, The Free Movement of Goods, in THE JUDICIAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 109, 109 (2004) (concluding the ECJ imposed its vision 
of the Common Market). 
 106. The role of ECJ case law in the establishment of the Common Market from 
1958 to 1986 will be explored by Brigitte Leucht in the framework of the 
“Towards a New History of European Public Law” project at University of 
Copenhagen, directed by the present author (http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk). 
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the ECJ ran much deeper than hitherto assumed. This resistance 
continued into the 1980s and possibly beyond. 
In addition, the new historical research offers key methodological 
insights. The member states did not only act as recipients of 
European public law; they were in a number of respects providing 
the constitutive frame in terms of legal theory and practice from 
which a European public law could develop. This has for some time 
been acknowledged in existing research, particularly in the case of 
the German Constitutional Court’s Solange jurisprudence, which 
deeply influenced ECJ case law.107 Consequently, national judiciaries 
have certainly been able to shape the direction of how European 
public law developed through the mechanism of preliminary 
references, in particular if they embraced the basic tenets of the 
constitutional practice.108 What historical research demonstrates is 
that national constitutional systems have influenced and framed how 
European public law could develop beyond the single responses of 
national courts to ECJ case law. Legal culture and practice of the 
member states in general have in fundamental ways shaped the 
history of European law. Peter Lindseth’s historical analysis of the 
negotiations of the Treaties of Paris and Rome is striking because it 
demonstrates how intimately connected the various legal tools 
chosen for European integration were with the post-war development 
of administrative law in the national contexts was with the various 
legal tools chosen for European integration.109 Karin van Leeuwen’s 
path-breaking analysis of Dutch constitutional reforms similarly 
demonstrates just how the way the Dutch constitutional system was 
designed to incorporate international law set the scene for the 
development of European public law after 1958.110 In fact the very 
 
 107. See ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 
17, at 64–123. 
 108. See generally id. at 33–182 (discussing French and German judicial 
acceptance of European law supremacy and how this has shaped the development 
of European public law). 
 109. See LINDSETH, supra note 28, at 91–119 (explaining the connection 
between post-war national administrative law and European public law). 
 110. Van Leeuwen, supra note 54, at 357; see Bruno de Witte & Monica Claes, 
Report on the Netherlands, in THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS – 
DOCTRINES AND JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT 171, 
178 (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al. eds., 1998) (affirming that the “manner by which 
the European Court’s views were formulated may bear the stamp of Dutch 
influence”). 
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design of the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy by the ECJ 
was deeply influenced by the Dutch model, granting only supremacy 
to European legal norms that had direct effect, thereby emulating the 
Dutch constitutional condition for international law supremacy, 
namely that it is “binding on anyone.”111 To conclude, the 
constitutive nature of how national constitutional systems and legal 
cultures have influenced and shaped European public law constitutes 
an exiting new field of research, which certainly will help refine the 
general interpretation of the historical development of European 
public law.  
Finally, there is no doubt that historical analyses of the role of the 
member states in the development of European public law have 
uncovered a more complex reality than portrayed in existing legal 
and social science research. In the first systematic historical study of 
member state reception recently published by Bill Davies, it is 
demonstrated that the reception of European public law cannot 
simply be reduced to concern mainly the relationship between the 
ECJ and the German courts.112 From the 1950s onwards, it 
systematically involved politicians, a number of ministries, the large 
German legal academic elite, and the general public. The 
development of a constitutional practice by the European institutions 
consequently touched upon not only the competences of national 
courts, but also deep-seated political interests, questions of legal 
culture, and national identity. Early and partial results from historical 
studies of France and the Netherlands confirm the broad implications 
of European public law on national life and consequently suggest 
that we need to approach the role of the member states with much 
more comprehensive studies.113  
 
 111. Bignami, supra note 86, at 20–21; see also De Witte & Claes, supra note 
110, at 178 (asserting that the “Netherlands have been an important testing-ground 
in the course of the 1950s . . . for the principles of direct effect and supremacy as 
they were formulated by the European Court in the 1960s”). 
 112. DAVIES, supra note 3. 
 113. Doctoral students Alexandre Bernier (University of Copenhagen) and Karin 
Van Leeuwen (University of Amsterdam) prepared large case studies on France 
and the Netherlands, respectively. Likewise, doctoral student Jonas Pedersen 
(Aarhus University) will conduct a case study on Denmark in the next three years. 
All projects are part of the “Towards a New History of European Public Law” 
project at University of Copenhagen, directed by the present author 
(http://europeanlaw.saxo.ku.dk). 
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All in all, historical research has begun to demonstrate that the 
member states played a more complex role than hitherto assumed, it 
has confirmed recent social science and legal research of how 
contestation over the constitutional practice seemingly has been a 
lasting feature of the history of European public law, and, finally, it 
has begun to explore how the national constitutional systems and 
legal cultures provided a constitutive framework—a fixed variety of 
options—for the development of European public law. Taken 
together with the section on how the constitutional practice first 
evolved, this section suggests that the classical historical narrative of 
the constitutional paradigm needs to be replaced with a new history 
of European public law—a history that reveals the deeper legal, 
social, and political nature of the constitutional practice and a history 
that does not assume that member states progressively accepted the 
constitutional practice and a European rule of law. 
VI. TOWARD A NEW HISTORY OF EUROPEAN 
PUBLIC LAW 
Let me finish this article by emphasizing that historical research in 
European public law is still very much in its infancy. There are still 
many questions and even entire subfields that remain unexplored. In 
this sense, this article merely constitutes a preliminary attempt to 
offer an assessment of what historians can tell us about the 
development and nature of European public law. It is also important 
to underline that the arguments presented primarily concern the 
history of European law from 1950 to 1986. Let me briefly 
summarize the key contributions that current historical writings 
offer. 
Historical research firmly contextualizes the establishment and 
development of European public law in the broader social-economic, 
legal, and political development of the member states and European 
institutions. Historical analyses have demonstrated that we need to 
include a wider range of actors to understand the development of 
European public law.114 Focusing merely on the ECJ and national 
courts is not enough. Historical analyses have crucially offered a 
distinct and revisionist account of both the emergence and 
development of the constitutional practice and how that practice was 
 
 114. See generally Boerger-De Smedt, La Cour de Justice, supra note 66. 
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received by the member states.  
The constitutional practice was caused by a combination of 
historical factors, most importantly the agency of the Legal Service 
of the Commission. It was promoted by a transnational alliance 
involving the European institutions and a transnational network of 
pro-European jurists. While the constitutional practice shaped the 
case law of the ECJ from 1963 onwards, the impact on the member 
states was relatively limited. Until the mid-1980s, member states 
continued to run the Community largely in the manner they had 
intended with the EEC Treaty. Member state control over decision-
making, administration, and the application of European law were 
the prominent features. A key reason for this continued state of 
affairs, beyond the initial cautiousness of the ECJ itself before 1967, 
was the widespread resistance toward the doctrines of the 
constitutional practice from national administrations, courts, and 
legal elites in general. Historical research has demonstrated how 
complex member state reception of European law actually was. Not 
only did it involve a larger number of domestic actors than hitherto 
assumed, but member state legal norms and practice also very much 
influenced the development of European public law. Member states 
thus did not only receive ECJ case law; they also played a 
constitutive role for the general development of European public law.  
As an overall interpretation of the history of European public law, 
focusing on the period from 1950 to the mid-1980s, the new 
historical research rejects key assumptions of the constitutional 
paradigm, which still holds such a grip on the academic field of EU 
law today. It argues that the ECJ did not manage to 
“constitutionalize” the Treaties of Rome, even if the discourse in EU 
law increasingly claimed this to be the case in the 1980s. Rather, the 
court had promoted, together with the Commission and the European 
Parliament as well as transnational networks of pro-European jurists, 
a constitutional practice in European public law—one the member 
states did not, as claimed, progressively accept. Instead, the 
constitutional practice was subject to continued contestation and 
resistance by important national administrative and legal elites, 
which largely contained the impact of ECJ case law in key member 
states.  
Some might argue, as Alec Stone Sweet and Thomas Brunell have 
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done, that contestation and resistance by national administrations and 
courts should not surprise us.115 It may be that the European legal 
order in terms of administrative implementation and national court 
application looks fragmented, but this does not differ very much 
from other federal polities such as Canada or the United States.116 
The comparison of the European legal order with its North Atlantic 
neighbors certainly brings out the federal elements in ECJ case law 
and, in this sense, easily lends itself to the conclusion that the 
European Union has undergone comparable processes of 
constitutionalization and federalization.117  
I think this conclusion is premature until we have a much more 
detailed history of what factors and processes actually shaped the 
history of European law. While the argument can certainly be made 
that ECJ case law contains important federal doctrines,118 it does not 
follow that the administrative practices nor the role of law in the 
European Communities/European Union have been of a federal 
 
 115. See generally Stone Sweet & Brunell, Constructing a Supranational 
Constitution, supra note 24. 
 116. Id. at 100. 
 117. See David M. Trubek, Consumer Law, Common Markets and Federalism: 
Introduction and General Concepts, in 3 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE 
AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE, 14, 14–26 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. 
eds., 1987) (comparing consumer protection measures taken in the U.S. federal 
system and the European Community); Boerger-De Smedt & Rasmussen, supra 
note 11, at 9–10 (outlining the process Stein undertook to establish his comparative 
study of European and American law). Compare Vincent Blasi, Constitutional 
Limitations on the Power of States to Regulate the Movement of Goods in 
Interstate Commerce, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 174 (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., 1982) 
(discussing constitutionalization of the United States in the context of interstate 
commerce), with Henry G. Schermers, The Role of the European Court of Justice 
in the Free Movement of Goods, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES 
FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, supra, at 222 (analyzing the federalization 
of the European Union “with respect to freedom of movement of goods”). The 
normative implication of making the comparison must have been obvious to the 
authors. We know it was to Eric Stein, who organized the Bellagio conference of 
1977, which brought together the authors of the first book mentioned. 
 118. See Giuseppe Martinico, Reading the Others: American Legal Scholars and 
the Unfolding European Integration, 11 EUR. J.L. REFORM 35, 35–50 (2009) 
(indicating that the federal principles that the ECJ employs are inspired by U.S. 
legal scholars). But see T. Sandalow & E. Stein, On the Two Systems: An 
Overview, in 1 COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE UNITED 
STATES AND EUROPE, 9–15 (arguing that the U.S. federal experience did not 
influence the ECJ). 
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nature. Indeed, future research will determine whether ECJ case law 
constituted a high-profile and successful attempt to federalize and 
constitutionalize the European Union, or whether the court has 
largely failed in its endeavor. The concepts such as European 
constitution and “constitutionalization” were always deeply 
normative attempts to legitimize and strengthen the case law of the 
ECJ. We need to reopen the history of European public law by 
leaving behind the notion that it has developed or necessarily will 
develop into a European constitution. Only by doing this will we be 
able to discern the extent to which the constitutional practice was 
contested and even more crucially empirically trace the way 
European public law was actually practiced in the Community/Union 
and the member states. This critique applies just as well to current 
attempts to save the concept of constitution in relation to European 
public law. Note that such an understanding of the history of 
European public law does not deny that the ECJ did indeed promote 
a constitutional practice or that such a practice permeated ECJ case 
law and EU law academically. Also, it does not imply a rejection of 
the notion that the ECJ might to some extent successfully manage to 
strengthen the federal traits of the European institutions through its 
case law. Nor does it exclude the possibility that the European 
electorate will eventually pass a European constitution by 
referendum.  
What it does is replace normative attempts to legitimize the ECJ 
through the constitutional claim with a more accurate understanding 
of the driving forces behind the development of European public 
law. Only by critically and accurately understanding its own history 
can the EU today begin to address the persistent crisis of legitimacy 
that haunts it and seriously jeopardizes current attempts to save the 
euro and, with it, the Single European Market and the union itself. 
 
